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ABSTRACT
This paper first describes an ‘obfuscating’ compiler technology de-
veloped for encrypted computing, then examines if the trivial case
without encryption producesmuch-sought indistinguishability ob-
fuscation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Encrypted computing [1] means running on a processor that ‘works
profoundly encrypted’ in user mode, taking encrypted inputs to en-
crypted outputs via encrypted intermediate values in registers and
memory. Encryption keys for such processors are installed at man-
ufacture, as with Smartcards [10], or uploaded in public view to a
write-only internal store via a Diffie-Hellman circuit [5], and are
not accessible to the operator and operating system, who are the
unprivileged user’s potential adversaries in this context. Prototype
processors supporting encrypted computing include HEROIC [12],
CryptoBlaze [8] and the authors’ own KPU (Krypto Processing
Unit) [4]. The latter, clocked at 1GHz, measures on the industry-
standard Dhrystones benchmark [13] with AES (American Encryp-
tion Standard) 128-bit encryption [6] as equivalent to a 433MHz
classic Pentium. HEROIC and CryptoBlaze use the much slower
Paillier [11] (partially homomorphic1) encryption at 2048 bits or
more.
A context in which an attack by the operator may be a risk, for
example, is where scenes from animation cinematography are be-
ing rendered in a server farm. On-site operators have an opportu-
nity to pirate for profit portions of the movie before release and
may be tempted. Another possible risk scenario is processing in a
specialised facility of satellite photos of a foreign power’s military
installations to reveal changes since a previous pass. If an opera-
tor (or a hacked operating system) can modify the data to show no
change where there has been some, then that is an option for espi-
onage. A successful attack by the operator in both cases is one that
discovers the plaintext of user data or alters it to order. It is shown
in [3] that, given that the encryption is independently secure:
1E[x+y] = E[x ] ∗ E[y] mod m, Paillier encryption E, public keym.
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Theorem. There is no method, deterministic or stochastic, that can
read a bit of plaintext data from a program trace or rewrite the pro-
gram to generate a target bit to order, with any probability above
random chance.
The method that is ruled out is not restricted to polynomial com-
plexities (in the encryption block size), but apart from that and
the extra hypothesis, that is classic ‘cryptographic semantic secu-
rity’ [7] and the meaning here is ‘encrypted computing does not
compromise encryption’. The result also depends on stochastically-
based compilation, as follows.
An appropriate ‘obfuscating’ compilation C[−]r for encrypted
computing and ANSI C [9] takes an expression e of the source lan-
guage and compiles it to machine code mc that puts it in register
r but deliberately misses the nominal value by an offset ∆e that it
generates, as set out in [2]:
C[e]r = (mc,∆e) (1)
The operational semantics of the generated object codemc is such
that it changes processor state s0 to an s1 with a ciphertext s1(r )
in r whose plaintext value beneath the encryption E differs by ∆e
from the nominal value2 e :
s0
mc
 s1 where s1(r ) = E[e + ∆e] (2)
The following lemma encapsulates the compiler specification:
Lemma. Object codes mc from the same source are identical apart
from embedded (encrypted) constants. The runtime traces are also
identical apart from the cipherspace values read and written, such
that, for any particular plaintext 32-bit value x , the probability across
different compilations that E[x] is in a given register or memory loca-
tion at any given point in the trace is uniformly 1/232, independently
to the maximum extent permitted by copy instructions and loops in
the code.
The proviso is because a plain copy (‘mov’) instruction always has
precisely the same input and output, and a loop means the ‘delta’
variations introduced by the compiler must be the same at the be-
ginning as at the end of the loop.
The set of deltas generated by the compiler as above, one per
register and memory location per point in the control graph is an
obfuscation scheme O. The user knows the scheme, so can interpret
the program output after decryption, but ‘the processor’ does not
know it, nor does the operator or operating system, in addition
to not having access to the encryption key. The compiler can also
generate schemes in which the input and final output deltas are
zero. Then different object codes that look the same apart from
constants, whose traces look the same apart from values written
and read, end up with the same (correct, encrypted) values from
2Syntax e vs. value s(e ) are not distinguished for succinctness here.
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the same inputs. That is a kind of obfuscation, limited to different
programs from the same source by the same compiler.
That is the established theory. The question here is [i] if encryp-
tion E is really necessary, and [ii], what happens if a virtual ma-
chine (VM) is compiled to machine codes v ′1, v
′
2 conforming to ob-
fuscation schemes O1,O2 respectively alongwith dataE[p1],E[p2]
interpreted byv ′1,v
′
2 as programs, and data E[d] for them. The data
d is the same for both because it is compiled with delta zero, but
deltas for p1, p2 differ.
Looking at [ii] first, by definition, on a processor for encrypted
computing:
v ′1(E[p1],E[d]) = E[o], v
′
2(E[p2],E[d]) = E[o] (3)
Examining that for [i], on an unencrypted platform, where v1 and
v2 are the versions of the programs that embed unencrypted con-
stants in the machine code instructions instead of encrypted con-
stants, gives
v1(p1,d) = o = v2(p2,d) (4)
Both programs produce the same results. The traces are those of
the repetitive virtual machine cycle interpreting the incoming data
as instructions and modifying components of its state (which may
be thought of as a finite array representing memory) to suit. They
take the same time to finish. The different obfuscation schemes
will have scrambled the access patterns (the compiler changes the
delta in force for a pointer or array index at every increment to
it). It is impossible to tell which is which, but both come from the
same source.
What happens with different source codes with the same func-
tionality? One expects traces to be different lengths and show dif-
ferent patterns, but supposenow that instructions are ordered/numbered
arbitrarily in p1, p2 and there is only one instruction type for the
VM: add, compare and jump:
L0 : if (Y = X +A) < Z + B goto L1 else goto L2 (5)
There, A, B are constants, X , Y , Z are program variables, L0, L1,
L2 are instruction locations. Comparisons and additions wrap in
the 2s complement arithmetic. This one instruction suffices for all
computation: it is the instruction in HEROIC’s encrypted ‘one in-
struction computing’ (OIC) system.
An instruction (5) can also be interpreted via X=x+a, Y=y+b ,
Z=z+c , where x , y, z are ‘virtual variables’ and a, b , c are secret
constants, as follows:
L0 : if (y = x +A
′) < z + B ′ goto L1 else goto L2 (6)
where A′ = A + a − b , B ′ = B + c − b .
Our compiler for encrypted computing already randomly gen-
erates deltas a, b , c by varying A, B, C per instruction and man-
ages the deltas over the course of translation of a given program
to maintain the intended source code semantics. Here the ‘virtual
variables’ x , y, z in (6) have no physical existence so cannot be
directly observed, but that is abstractly the same situation as on
an encrypted computing platform, where encryption protects reg-
ister and memory contents. Theory developed for the compiler in
the encrypted computing context then applies. The Lemma affirms
the compiler can design instruction constantsA, B,C to vary secret
a, b , c deltas independently and arbitrarily.
Only the user who knows those ‘program keys’ a, b , c can inter-
pret the program’s functioning, and they can only run the program
code correctly as data p for a virtual machine v that is supplied
with it if they know the ‘master key’ consisting of the obfuscation
scheme O for v . The VM v can have been customised for p with a
different interpretation unit for each instruction internal to p, plus
the compiler’s obfuscations.
SUMMARY
A compiler for encrypted computing, on each recompilation of the
same source, generates object code of the same structure for which
the runtime traces also have the same structure but for which the
data (beneath the encryption if there is any) differs at each point
in the trace and memory with flat stochastic distribution, indepen-
dently to the maximal extent.
The full paper looks at what that compiler does in an unen-
crypted context where it translates source to machine code for a
virtual machine. Instead of encrypted registers and memory, vir-
tual content is hidden via secret deltas from physical values. Trans-
lation of a particular source code constructs are examined very
carefully to see if this mechanism can possibly amount formally
to ‘indistinguishability obfuscation’.
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